The Indonesian Economy During the Japanese Occupation by Wie, T. K. (Thee)
Masyarakat Indonesia, Volume 39, No. 2, Desember 2013 | 327
THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY DURING THE 
JAPANESE OCCUPATION1
THEE Kian Wie
Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI)
ABSTRACT
This article is written as one of many tributes to Professor Anne Booth of the 
Department of Economics, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University 
of London, who will retire by the end of 2013. This tribute is certainly warranted as 
Anne Booth is without doubt a redoubtable scholar specialized in the economy and 
history of the Southeast Asian nations, particularly Indonesia. The article starts with 
discussing developments in the Netherlands Indies in the 1930s, which is followed 
by a discussion of developments in the Netherlands Indies on the eve of the Japanese 
invasion. The article then discusses political developments in Japan in the 1930s; 
followed by a discussion of the start of the Pacific War and the fall of the Netherlands 
Indies. The main focus of the article concerns the Indonesian economy during the 
Japanese occupation of Indonesia (March 1942 – August 1945).
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INTRODUCTION
In an act, which in hindsight is difficult to explain, on 8 December 1941, 
the Netherlands government, in exile in London after the German army had 
occupied the Netherlands in early May 1940, declared war on Japan. The 
question arises whether this was based on the strong confidence that the 
Netherlands government could rely on the support of the United States and 
Great Britain in defending the Netherlands Indies?
1 Paper for the Festschrift in Honour of Professor Anne Booth.
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The declaration of war happened even before the United States had declared 
war on Japan after the sudden Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 
1941. In the Netherlands Indies, Governor-General Tjarda van Starkenborgh 
Stachouwer, announced on radio that the country was now at war. Because of 
this, all men on mandatory service were ordered to be present at their assigned 
place of mobilization on 12 December (Nieuwenhuis 1979: 11-12). On 8 
December 1942 around 2,000 Japanese citizens living in the Netherlands Indies 
were arrested as a precautionary measure (De Jong 2002: 31).
News circulated in the Netherlands Indies that after the attack on Pearl Harbor, 
the Japanese army had already landed in British Malaya and was rapidly 
approaching Singapore, considered to be an impregnable fortress, and that 
Japanese planes had attacked Hong Kong. On 10 December 1941 the radio 
also reported that Japanese planes had torpedoed two large British battleships, 
the ‘Prince of Wales’ and ‘Repulse’ off the east coast of British Malaya. This 
news greatly worried the government and many people in the Netherlands 
Indies (Nieuwenhuis 1979: 12).
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NETHERLANDS INDIES IN THE 1930S 
Like  the rest of the world, the Netherlands Indies experienced a serious 
economic crisis in the early 1930s. As an exporter of primary commodities, 
it was especially hard hit when the industrialized countries cut back imports 
of raw materials. The cost-cutting measures taken by the Netherlands Indies 
government caused widespread unrest, not only among the Indonesian 
population who suffered the most, but also among the Europeans who were 
increasingly threatened by unemployment and a drop in their living standards 
(De Jong 2002: 23). The large European-owned large estates (cultivating 
tobacco, rubber, oil palm, and Manila hemp) in Sumatra’s East coast (now 
North Sumatra province) had to lay off hundreds of thousands of their workers, 
many of whom Javanese. As a result, almost all of them returned to Java.
The severity of the crisis in the 1930s is indicated by the fact that between 
1928 and 1934 the export volume fell by almost 4 per cent per annum, export 
prices by almost 20 per cent and real money supply by more than 2 per cent 
per annum. It is estimated that GDP of the Netherlands Indies fell by 3.4 per 
cent per year over these years (Booth 1998: 39). 
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The worldwide economic depression of the 1930s was triggered in the United 
States by various factors, including the mechanization in wheat production, 
retained high selling prices by provision of large credits, cost reduction 
measures in manufacturing in the United States industries, and particularly, 
excessive speculation on New York’s stock exchange. Not surprisingly, on 
29 October 1929 a serious financial and economic crisis broke out which in 
a short time spread to the whole world (Gonggrijp 1949: 211), including the 
Netherlands Indies.
The Netherlands Indies suffered severely as it was the only debtor country in 
the world which only waited with depreciating its currency against gold until 
September 1936. As a result, the Indonesian smallholders in the islands outside 
of Java, particularly in Sumatra and Kalimantan, who cultivated export crops, 
such as rubber, pepper, coffee, maize, and forest products, became much poorer 
when the prices of their export crops declined by 60-75 per cent, while their 
expenditures did not drop as much. Not surprisingly, the circulation of money 
in the villages declined tremendously (Gonggrijp, 1949 217-218).
The indigenous smallholders were not burdened by fixed costs and therefore 
more competitive than the large estates. Whereas the plantation rubber exports 
were regulated by individual export licenses according to basic production 
quotas, smallholder rubber exports were regulated by a special export tax. 
This tax reduced the internal price in order to keep the peasant rubber exports 
as a constant fraction of total rubber exports. The ratio was fixed in favour 
of the plantations, since the output capacity of peasant rubber exports had 
expanded rapidly as a result of new rubber plantings during the boom period 
of 1925-1926. These young rubber trees had not yet reached maturity by 1929, 
the year on which the ratio was based. Because rubber exports proved to be 
highly price-elastic, the variable export tax generated the desired degree of 
restriction (McFadyean 1944: 96).
This was the situation when in September 1931, B.C. de Jonge was appointed 
Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies. As an extreme conservative, De 
Jonge had not the slightest sympathy with the aspirations of the Indonesian 
nationalist movement (De Jong 2002: 23). In response to a demand by 
Indonesian nationalists to grant autonomy (not independence!), he stated: 
‘We have been here for three hundred years, and we will be here for another 
three hundred years!’ This statement clearly reflected the feelings or even the 
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conviction among many Dutchmen that the possession of the Netherlands 
Indies was taken for granted (Wertheim 1995: 154).
Based on this statement, President Sukarno said, and other Indonesians even 
today say, that Indonesia was colonized by the Dutch for three hundred years, 
which historically is totally wrong. This statement would have implied that 
when Cornelis de Houtman landed in the port of Banten in 1596, he and his 
four ships had swept over the entire Indonesian archipelago like a tsunami!
The only positive measure taken in response to the aspirations of the 
Indonesian nationalists was the appointment of the Visman Commission by 
Governor-General Tjarda van Starkenborgh in mid-September 1940. This 
commission was given the task of ‘enquiring into the wishes, movements 
and views among the different nationalities, classes, and levels, as to the 
constitutional development of the Netherlands Indies, and in connection with 
that, the position of the various groups in the population’ (De Jong 2002: 28).
THE NETHERLANDS INDIES 
ON THE EVE OF THE JAPANESE INVASION
After the German invasion of the Netherlands, several Indonesian 
organizations in Batavia issued manifestos calling on their members to stand 
behind the colonial government and support the authorities. Following the 
German invasion, and particularly after the declarations of loyalty from 
Indonesians, some kind of goodwill gesture might have been expected from 
the Indies government. However, no such gesture was forthcoming. The 
Governor-General took the view that no fundamental policy changes could be 
initiated as long as the war continued, and thus let the opportunity pass. The 
Boven Digoel internment camp in western New Guinea stayed in place, and 
the nationalist leaders Sukarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir were not released from exile 
(De Jong 2002: 27-28).
Meanwhile, the serious economic crisis experienced by the Netherlands Indies 
led the Indies’ government to resort to measures such as import quotas and a 
licensing system for the import of Japanese products. Import restrictions were 
seen as particularly necessary because of the growth of Japanese imports, 
especially textiles which were both displacing European imports and harming 
domestic production. In fact, most of the arguments, which were used to justify 
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the adoption of quantitative restrictions on imports, were basically concerned 
with the so-called Japanese threat (Booth 1998: 44).
The increasing share of Japanese imports in the total imports entering the 
Netherlands Indies led to a large deficit in the bilateral trade with Japan since 
Japan purchased much less products from Japan. The strong competition from 
Japanese ships in the international and interisland shipping of the Netherlands 
Indies caused great concern among the Netherlands Indies government 
(Gonggrijp 1949: 240-241). On the other hand, the lower prices of the 
imported Japanese products, due to the substantial devaluation of the yen, 
greatly benefited the Indonesian population These lower prices were largely 
due to the lower wages of the Japanese factory workers and greater efficiency 
of Japanese manufacturing due to modernization (Gonggrijp 1949: 228).
The quantitative restrictions on the Japanese imports elicited sharp protests by 
the Japanese government. To try to deal with these protests, the Netherlands 
Indies government sent an invitation to the Japanese government for a 
conference in Batavia. The Japanese delegation was led by Nagaoka, while the 
Dutch delegation was led by J.W. Meijer Ranneft, vice-president of the Council 
of the Netherlands Indies. On his arrival in Batavia on 3 June 1934, Nagaoka 
issued a statement that the relationship between Japan and the Netherlands 
Indies should be based on the principle of ‘co-existence and the common 
welfare’ (of both peoples) (Gonggrijp 1949: 241).
For the Japanese at stake was not only Japan’s share of the Netherlands 
Indies imports, but also the colonial distribution system, with the Dutch 
insisting that not more than 25 per cent of Japanese imports could be handled 
directly through Japanese residents in the colony. After tough and protracted 
negotiations, the Hart-Ichizawa agreement was finally signed in April 1937 
(Dick et al. 2002: 159).
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN JAPAN IN THE 1930S
In the early 1930s the Japanese military elite, determined to extend the 
country’s sphere of influence, came to power in Japan. Japanese expansionist 
ambitions on Asia inevitably led to conflict with China and the Western 
powers. In 1937 war broke out when units of the Japanese Kwantung army, 
stationed near Beijing, were fired on by units of the Chinese army while on 
exercise. This incident led to full-scale war between Japan and China, which 
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continued for almost nine years until the end of the Pacific War on 15 August 
1945 (Morishima 1984: 130) The bloody Pacific War only ended when Japan 
surrendered unconditionally to the Allies after American planes had thrown 
an atomic bomb on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 and a plutonium bomb on 
Nagasaki on 9 August 1945, and after the Soviet Union had declared war on 
Japan, despite the neutrality pact that Japan had signed with the Soviet Union.
When war broke out with China, the Japanese army had confidently anticipated 
that the Chinese army would immediately surrender. However, the Japanese 
army found itself barely maintaining a front that stretched across an immense 
geographical area under tenacious Chinese resistance. The Japanese army had 
established the North China Development Corporation and the Central China 
Promotion Cooperation and was drawing up plans to develop coal, iron ore, 
salt, and other natural resources, and bring them to Japan for use in munitions 
plants. Unfortunately for Japan, there was no prospect of bringing the war with 
China to a quick resolution (Nakamura 1994: 106). Given these conditions, 
one might ask why Japan became embroiled in a war with the United States, 
Great Britain, and the Netherlands? (Nakamura 1994: 106).
From an economic perspective, the Japanese reasons for going to war with 
the Western powers were that China would not surrender to Japan, as it was 
supported by the United States and Great Britain. Hence, Japan applied 
pressure in occupied China by blockading Britain’s lease territory in Tianjin 
during its occupation of China. As a result, relations with the United States 
and Britain, which had already deteriorated, steadily worsened. In fact, 
America announced that it was abrogating the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Commerce 
and Navigation. This abrogation was a momentous step, as this treaty 
had contained provisions which granted Japan a most favoured nation status. 
Once this Treaty was revoked, United States would be free to restrict or ban 
exports to Japan, including a ban on the export of machine tools and the most 
important resources for which Japan depended on America, including petrol, 
crude oil, and scrap iron (Nakamura 1994: 107).
After Japan had occupied the southern part of French Indochina in July 1941, 
the United States, Great Britain, and the Dutch in the Netherlands Indies 
imposed a total embargo on oil exports to Japan. As a result, Japan now faced 
a serious dilemma, since both its army and navy were greatly dependent on 
imported oil with only about a two-year supply available. Victory in China 
had to come soon, or Japan’s aggression against China would grind to halt.
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In facing the need to act quickly and decisively, Japan faced two choices. 
One was to stop the war with China and withdraw its troops as America had 
demanded, and settle back to profit economically from the war in Europe, 
as it had done during World War I. The second choice for Japan was to take 
another step forward in establishing an economic empire in Asia without the 
attendant costs of conquest, if it could disentangle itself from the war with 
China (Reischauer 1981: 209).
But economic self-interest did not turn out to be the decisive factor. To Japan’s 
military, withdrawal from China seemed a national loss of face that could not 
be tolerated. On the other hand, the United States insisted that no settlement 
could be arranged with Japan until the gains of Japan’s aggression in China 
since 1931 had been relinquished. The other alternative for Japan was to 
go south, break America’s tightening blockade by seizing the resources of 
Southeast Asia, ,particularly the oil of the Netherlands Indies. With this move 
Japan could thus achieve at one great blow the much-wanted Greater East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. In taking such a step, Japan had secured its rear 
by signing a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union in April 1941 (Reischauer 
1981: 209).
THE START OF THE PACIFIC WAR
AND THE FALL OF THE NETHERLANDS INDIES
Repeating the strategy during its war with Russia in 1904-1905, Japan began 
the war with the United States when its torpedo and dive bombers launched a 
brilliantly successful surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on the island of Oahu in 
Hawaii on Sunday, 7 December 1941 (Buruma 2004: 111). This attack crippled 
the American navy with a single sharp blow, virtually eliminating its battleship 
fleet. Unfortunately for the Japanese, they missed the aircraft carriers, which 
were to prove a far more important weapon in the subsequent war. However, 
the attack on Pearl Harbor cleared the way for an easy attack of Southeast Asia 
(Reischauer 1981: 211), including Indonesia.
Actually, before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Admiral Yamamoto 
Isoroku, the architect of the attack, had warned Prime Minister Konoe that 
Japan could successfully challenge the United States for one year at the most. 
But what urged Yamamoto to go along with the attack on Pearl Harbor? The 
most likely explanation is not a Führer’s Diktat, as in Nazi Germany’s attack 
Thee Kian Wie | The Indonesian Economy During the Japanese Occupation
00-MI-39,-No 2-2013.indd   333 02/06/2014   15:42:21
334 | Masyarakat Indonesia, Volume 39, No. 2, Desember 2013
on the Soviet Union in June 1941, but weakness, even paralysis, at the highest 
levels of the Japanese government. If few Japanese deeply desired a war with 
the Western powers, nobody, except possibly the Emperor himself, was able 
or willing to stop it (Buruma 2004: 115).
Be that as it may, on 7 December 1941 hostilities commenced with the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The war progressed far more advantageously 
for the Japanese than originally anticipated. Within six months, Japan had 
occupied Burma, Thailand, British Malaya, Singapore, the Philippines and 
Borneo, as well as Celebes, Java, and Sumatra in the Netherlands Indies. To 
the east, Japan had not only landed in parts of New Guinea, but even occupied 
the Solomon Islands southeast of New Guinea (Nakamura 1994: 111).
The chief targets of the Japanese operations in the Netherlands Indies were the 
oilfields at Tarakan off northeast Kalimantan, Balikpapan in East Kalimantan, 
and Palembang, in South Sumatra. In the night of 10-11 January 1942 about 
6,000 Japanese troops landed at Tarakan. The oil wells had already been put 
out of action and the oil tanks set on fire. The demoralized troops of the Royal 
Netherlands Indies Army, KNIL (Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger) in 
Tarakan surrendered on the morning of 12 January (De Jong 2002: 35).
Other parts of the Netherlands Indies were already occupied in early 1942 
by Japanese troops. With the fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942 to the 
Japanese troops and the battle in the Java Sea, when the combined ABDA 
(American, British, Dutch, Australian) naval forces under command of Dutch 
Rear Admiral Karel Doorman lost the battle of the Java Sea on 27 February, the 
fate of the whole Indonesian archipelago was sealed (Van den Doel 2001: 62).
In the evening of 28 February 1942 and the early morning of 1 March 1942 
Japanese troops landed on four places on the north coast of Java without any 
hindrance. A few days later the situation for the Dutch army, including the 
KNIL, was already quite hopeless, also because the Indonesian population 
did not provide any support. In fact, in many places in Indonesia, including 
Batavia, Magelang and other cities, the Japanese army was welcomed 
enthusiastically by the Indonesian population (Van den Doel 2001: 62).
After a resistance of only nine days, on 8 March 1942, Lieutenant-General 
Ter Poorten, the Dutch commander-in-chief in the Netherlands Indies, signed 
an instrument of unconditional surrender to Japan in the Kalidjati airport in 
West Java, Hence, on that date the collapse of Dutch power in the Netherlands 
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Indies was complete with the capture and detention of the Governor-General, 
the symbol of Dutch power in the Netherlands Indies. Other important Dutch 
officials of high rank, among them Van Mook and Van der Plas, were able 
to escape to Australia (Sastroamijoyo 1979: 92-93). Hence, on that date the 
existence of the Netherlands Indies ended de facto (Van den Doel 2001: 62).
THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY DURING THE JAPANESE 
OCCUPATION
The Japanese occupation of Indonesia from March 1942 to August 1945 is 
widely regarded as a watershed in modern Indonesian history. While this 
notion may indeed be true for the political developments that were yet to 
come, the Japanese invasion also marked the beginning of economic hardship, 
instability and disintegration (Van Zanden & Marks 2012: 133).
Immediately following the Japanese occupation in early Marechg 1c942 the 
Japanese authorities requisitioned the houses of Dutch citizens to provide 
accommodation for the Japanese military, later also for so called Japanese 
‘economists’. Male citizens from countries with which Japan was at war , and 
thus were considered ‘enemies’, were put in camps, while Dutch women and 
their children were also put in camps, and were only allowed to take their most 
necessary furniture and clothes, and other utensils which they could carry. 
Eurasians, who could show or indicate to the Japanese authorities that they for 
more than 50 per cent were descendants from the indigenous Indonesian were 
exempted from being placed in the interned camps. But because they lacked 
adequate earnings to cover their basic needs, most of them had to sell any of 
their valuable possessions, so that by the end of the Japanese occupation, their 
possessions had been reduced considerably (Van Horn & Van der Maar, 2000: 
11).
Economic performance during the Japanese occupation was weak at best. 
Initially the reason for the Japanese invasion was to secure the supply of 
strategic raw materials to Japan, in particular petroleum, rubber, tin, and other 
metals. However, by the middle of 1943, damage to Japanese shipping by 
Allied submarines forced the Japanese administration to put a greater emphasis 
on economic self-sufficiency in the different regions, so that the demands on 
imports and shipping were minimized (Van Zanden & Marks 2012: 134).
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During the Japanese occupation, one of the main purposes of the Japanese 
occupation policy was the complete elimination of Western (predominantly 
Dutch, but also some American and British) presence and influence in 
Indonesia. In Java the Dutch governing elite was put into internment camps 
in March and April 1942, among them the Dutch Governor-General, all heads 
of government departments, public servants of the Department of the Interior, 
several senior police officers, teachers, physicians, judges, and lawyers. Many 
other Dutchmen also lost their jobs and income. In addition, several symbols 
of the Dutch presence in Indonesia were removed, such as the statue of Jan 
Pieterszoon Coen and the Van Heutsz monument in Batavia, which was 
renamed Jakarta (Van den Doel 2001: 69), a name that has since been retained.
The detention of the Dutch officials meant that the Japanese government 
administration was lacking leadership, because the Japanese army did not have 
sufficient manpower to fill the vacant positions with their own people. To fill 
the vacancies in the government administration, they appointed Indonesians 
whom they considered sufficiently capable and experienced to head the 
government offices in all fields and to exercise full responsibility. Naturally, 
the Japanese officials held the highest positions, and acted as the supervisors 
of their Indonesian officials (Sastroamijoyo 1979: 93).
The Japanese officials only acted in matters closely connected with the 
problems or needs of their war, while the Indonesian officials were given the 
task of speeding up the wheels of the civil administration. However, over time 
their duties were extended, and they had to assist their Japanese superiors in 
activities directly connected with the war effort, for instance, the gathering 
of food (rice, eggs, meat, etc.) and the provision of forced labour (romusha) 
(Sastroamijoyo 1979: 93). So for the first time in Indonesia’s modern history, 
Indonesian administrative officials were given the opportunity and responsibly 
to head Indonesia’s government offices and departments.
In response to food shortages, stringent rationing applied to most basic 
consumer goods, especially food and textiles. As a means of control, 
registration was linked to the newly formed neighbourhood associations, called 
tonarigumi in Japanese. These tonarigumi were established in Japan in the
1930s In Japanese-occupied Java these tonarigumi were introduced in April
1943, and named Roekoen Tetangga (R.T.) (Burgers 2010: 316); they have 
survived until the present day.
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In response to food shortages, stringent rationing was introduced over most 
basic consumer items, especially food and textiles. As a means of control, 
registration was linked to the newly formed tonarigumi. The daily .ration 
of rice was set nominally at only 200 grams per adult, with the balance of 
carbohydrates made up of corn and soybean. Only sugar, which no longer had 
an export market, was in plentiful supply. Urban dwellers therefore had just 
enough to eat, even if they could not enjoy their preferred diet (Dick et al. 
2002: 166).¨
The Japanese occupation also led to the destruction of a considerable part 
of Indonesia’s physical infrastructure, for instance harbours, railroads, and 
oil installations. The interisland shipping industry, consisting of steamships 
and motorized vessels, was halved. Hence, the outcome of the Japanese 
occupation was that the communications infrastructure with overseas countries 
was practically cut off. Only the transport and communications with Japan 
remained which, understandably, were totally dominated by the requirements 
of Japan’s war machine. The roads in Indonesia were badly maintained, if at 
all. Moreover, all motor cars were confiscated by the Japanese. For this reason, 
the transport and communications with abroad, but also within Indonesia, was 
totally disrupted (Burger 1975: 160).
Food production declined considerably, as reflected by the fact that 
immediately after the Japanese occupation rice production as a percentage of 
the average production for the period 1937–1941 was 68 per cent, for maize 
34 per cent, for cassava 44 per cent, for potatoes 73 per cent, for soybeans 40 
per cent, and for peanuts 36 per cent. The total nutritious value of this lower 
production was only around 60 per cent of the pre-war level. The Japanese 
authorities also attempted to make every district in Java self-sufficient in food 
supplies in view of the transport difficulties. Unfortunately, these efforts were 
unsuccessful, because the local conditions were not adequately taken into 
account and because the mandatory deliveries were often sabotaged by the 
Javanese population (Burger 1975: 160).
It was the damage to Japanese shipping by Allied submarines that forced the 
Japanese authorities to emphasize economic self-sufficiency. The so-called 
cultivation crops, such as rubber, coffee, tea, and quinine, which had been 
directly connected with the world market, were cut off from their traditional 
export markets (Van Zanden & Marks 2012: 134).
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In retrospect, people in Java almost unanimously state that during the Japanese 
occupation they suffered from terrible shortages of rice, and urban people often 
gave testimony of seeing many people dying on the street, even though by the 
end of the Dutch period, Java had become self-sufficient in rice (Kurasawa- 
Inomata 1997: 111).
Remaining Japanese archives also show that in 1944 and early 1945 the 
socio-economic conditions had deteriorated to such an extent that the death 
rate was much higher compared with the Dutch period. It is also difficult to 
establish exactly what the main causes of death were, but it is likely that that 
malnutrition directly and indirectly increased the death rate. Japanese statistics 
from the Semarang Central hospital show that during the six months between 
February 1943 and September 1943, 832 persons were treated for starvation 
and 366 persons died in the hospital (Kurasawa-Inomata 1997: 111).
The Japanese occupation authorities also desperately needed coal, and had 
to seek it at all cost. They, therefore, decided to open a new railway line, 
connecting Bayah on the south coast of Banten, to the existing rail line. This 
railway project was very ambitious and difficult to carry out, because it had to 
be completed in a very short time, while construction materials and tools were 
in short supply. To construct this railway line, the Japanese authorities recruited 
millions of romusha, euphemistically referred to as ‘economic soldiers’ (Van 
den Doel 2001: 70).
Work started in February 1943, and large numbers of romusha were recruited 
for this project. Up to its completion in April 1944, a total of 120,000 people 
had been mobilized. Meanwhile, in the coal-mining project of Bayah, 15,000 
romusha were working, of whom about 400 to 500 died every day (Kurasawa- 
Inomata 1997: 120).
CONCLUSION
The general picture of economic conditions during the Japanese occupation 
is thus appalling, when taking into account the suffering of millions of 
Indonesians who were subjected to forced labour by the Japanese authorities, 
combined with a terrible famine in 1944/45. By the end of the war, the lack 
of maintenance and Japanese damage formed the worst problems. In addition, 
large parts of the railway network had been shipped to Malaya and Thailand, 
and bridges were broken into pieces and sold as scrap iron, while river mouths 
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had not been dredged. The total loss and damage to the Indonesian economy 
was estimated at 2.3 billion guilders (in 1942 prices), which amounted to 
roughly 50 per cent of GDP of the Netherlands Indies in 1941. It would 
therefore require a long period of time to rehabilitate the economy, including 
Indonesia’s physical infrastructure, and to restore the economy to normal 
peacetime conditions (Van Zanden & Marks 2012: 136).
On the other side of the ledger, it is certainly true that without the Japanese 
occupation, it would have taken a much longer time for Indonesia to become 
independent. The reason was that the Netherlands Indies government acted 
harshly against any expression or action which it considered inflammatory. 
Indonesian nationalist leaders, who were considered dangerous because they 
disturbed or threatened peace and order (orde en rust), including Sukarno, 
Mohammad Hatta, and Sjahrir, were not only imprisoned, but also exiled to 
faraway places, such as Flores, Bencoolen, Banda, and Boven Digoel in what 
was then Dutch New Guinea (present-day Papua).
Another positive consequence of the Japanese occupation was that many 
Indonesians, who during the Dutch colonial period, occupied lower positions 
in the Dutch colonial bureaucracy, gained valuable experience and skills in 
running a modern bureaucracy. This experience and skills proved to be very 
valuable when Indonesia became independent.
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